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This paper investigates the eﬀects of neighborhood size and network structure
on strategic experimentation. We analyze a multi-arm bandit game with one safe
and two risky alternatives. In this setting, risk taking produces a learning exter-
nality and an opportunity for free riding. We conduct a laboratory experiment to
investigate whether group size and the network structure aﬀect risk taking. We ﬁnd
that group size has an eﬀect on risk taking that is qualitatively in line with equi-
librium predictions. Introducing an asymmetry among agents in the same network
with respect to neighborhood size leads to substantial deviations from equilibrium
play. Findings suggests that subjects react to changes in their direct neighborhood
but fail to play a best-response to their position within the network.
Keywords: strategic experimentation, experiment, bandit game, risk taking
JEL-Code: C91, D81, D85, O33
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The adoption of new technologies is acknowledged to be of outstanding importance for
economic development. Early adopters are often confronted with substantial risks that
are involved in trying out new technologies. Especially in developing countries, there
is strong evidence that diﬀusion depends crucially on the information that is provided
through the experience by the social environment (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley
and Udry, 2009). This paper analyzes experimentally how the structure of the neighbor-
hood inﬂuences risk taking in the presence of information externalities.
In situations with information externalities, the problem arises that individuals might
strategically delay the adoption of new technologies until others have taken the risk and
gathered the necessary information. This problem of strategic delay has received con-
siderable attention in the theoretical literature (Chamley and Gale, 1994; Kapur, 1995;
McFadden and Train, 1996). This paper follows Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller et al.
(2005) and Klein and Rady (2008) by investigating strategic experimentation as a multi-
arm bandit model. In this model the payoﬀs of the arms depend on the state of the world.
Individuals can choose between a “safe” arm whose payoﬀ does not depend on the state
and two “risky” arms whose payoﬀs vary with the state. In a ﬁrst period, experimenta-
tion with risky arms is costly in terms of expected value. However, risk taking provides
an opportunity for revealing the state and, subsequently, obtaining higher payoﬀs in a
second period. If actions and payoﬀs of neighbors are observable, a strategic interaction
with multiple equilibria emerges with an incentive to free-ride on the experimentation of
others.
Observations in the ﬁeld by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) suggest that the size of individuals’
neighborhood aﬀects experimentation with new technologies. Consistent with considera-
tions of strategic experimentation, individuals in neighborhoods with more adopters wait
with their utilization of new technologies. However, one striking feature of many commu-
nication networks relevant for the diﬀusion of new technologies is the unequal distribution
of individuals’ degree, i.e. their number of neighbors (Rogers, 2003). Individuals diﬀer
with respect to the size of their neighborhood. Combining learning with incentives for
strategic behavior in larger social networks with heterogeneous agents results in theoret-
ically very complex settings. These settings are tractable only by assuming that agents
are either partially informed about the network structure or situated in very simple net-
works (Bala and Goyal, 1998; Galeotti et al., 2009). This paper uses three simple network
settings - a pair, a fully connected network of four and a star network of four - to identify
whether subjects care about the structure of the network or base their decision solely on
their degree. The results of the experiment suggest that strategic experimentation does
take place in the laboratory setting. Neighborhood size, indeed, has a negative eﬀect on
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similarly in diﬀerent network structures although this structure is common knowledge.
This behavior leads to very diﬀerent results from theoretical equilbrium predictions in
which individuals would fully account for their position in the network.
Besides allowing for the analysis of very simple networks, laboratory experiments have
the advantage that social network and available information about neighbors is tightly
controlled. Additionally, network structures and the position within networks are exoge-
nously imposed. In empirical data, positions within networks are likely to be correlated
with unobservable factors. For example, Glaeser et al. (2000) ﬁnds ﬁeld evidence that
th enumber of individuals’ social connections are correlated with trusting and trustwor-
thy behavior. An emerging experimental literature has used this advantage of exogenous
network structures to disentangle eﬀects of network formation from incentive eﬀects of
network structure.1 Keser et al. (1998) and Berninghaus et al. (2002) look at equilibrium
selection in coordination games and vary the openness of the neighborhood, i.e. whether
individuals’ neighbors also play together. They ﬁnd that coordination converges less on
the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium in open neighborhoods. Kirchkamp and Nagel (2007)
look at the eﬀect of neighborhoods’ openness and size in a prisoner dilemma game and
ﬁnd evidence for less cooperation in larger neighborhoods. Very few studies have looked
at networks in which subjects diﬀer with respect to their neighborhood structure. Cas-
sar (2007) departs from the homogeneity of subjects by introducing perturbations in the
structure in coordination and prisoner’s dilemma games. Again coordination depends on
the openness of the neighborhood and cooperation is easier in local structures. To our
knowledge, Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2008) and Choi et al. (2009) are the only studies
that look at irregular network structures in a systematic way by using games that com-
bine public good and coordination aspects. Both ﬁnd that irregular network structures
can help to facilitate coordination by making strategies salient. We contribute to this
literature by showing that individuals react strongly to changes in their neighborhood
but fail to recognize the implications of the global network structure.
The early experimental literature on multi-arm bandit games mostly focused on individual
learning. Only recently, experimentalists became interested in the case in which diﬀerent
alternatives do not have independent distributions but a common state like in our model.
In situations with a common state, Charness and Levin (2005) ﬁnd evidence that play-
ers persistently ignore newly generated information by previous choices and undervalue
the information generated by their actions. Players who make errors are more likely to
ignore data that is in dissonance to their beliefs leading to imperfect learning. Strategic
interaction has only recently caught attention in bandit models. Boyce et al. (2008) look
1The experimental literature on network formation will not be discussed in this context. See Kosfeld
(2004) for an overview.
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the payoﬀs for the safe and the risky arm. They ﬁnd that experimental subjects indeed
behave strategically in this environment and respond to the information that is provided
by them consistent with (imperfect) reinforcement learning. Our results are consistent
with these previous experiences. Subjects behave strategically and respond to informa-
tion that is made available by others, however, imperfectly. This experiment shows that
strategic interaction and adoption decisions are strongly inﬂuenced by characteristics of
the neighborshood. We do not ﬁnd evidence that decision making errors confound our
results.
This paper proceeds as following: in section 2 we describe the theoretical model and the
resulting conjectures. Section 3 describes the experimental implementation whose results
are reported in section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2M o d e l
This model follows the two-arm bandit model by Keller et al. (2005) and Klein and Rady
(2008) with one safe and one risky arm with uncertain states and combines it with basic
games on networks (e.g., Goyal, 2007).
Model environment
Let N = {1,....,n} be a set of agents and agents i,j ∈ N be typical members of this set
with n ≥ 2. The game lasts for two round in discrete time with t = {0,1}. This time
structure allows trying out risky alternatives in the ﬁrst round and reaping the fruits of
this exploration in the second round. In these two periods, the essence of strategic delay
of adoption is captured without having to deal with more complex phenomena such as
diﬀusion in networks.
In every round, agents choose simultaneously between three alternatives: one safe alterna-
tive and two risky alternatives. The safe arm S yields a safe return s. This safe alternative
can be interpreted as the traditional way of doing things which yields a non-risky payoﬀ
to all agents. For the two risky alternatives R1 and R2 can be interpreted as the new way
of doing things for which two distinct types exist, called “good” and “bad”. If a risky arm
is “good” it yields a payoﬀ r with certainty which is higher than the safe arm r>s>0.
If a risky arm is bad it always yields a payoﬀof 0. It is common knowledge that exactly
one of the two risky arms is of the “good” type and the other arm is of the “bad” type.
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in state R2 alternative R2 is “good” and alternative R1 is “bad”. State R1 and R2 occur
with probability 1/2. . With this assumption agents are ex-ante indiﬀerent between the
two risky alternatives, i.e. the expected payoﬀ of the ﬁrst and the second risky arm is
equal in the ﬁrst period. In summary states determine payoﬀs as follows:
State Probability of state Payoﬀ S Payoﬀ R1 Payoﬀ R2
R1 1/2 s r 0
R2 1/2 s 0 r
Agents can observe their payoﬀs at the end of each round and the actions and payoﬀs
of neighbors. We denote gij ∈{ 0,1} as the relationship between agent i and j with
gij =0if the two agents are not linked and cannot observe each other and gij =1if
they are neighbors in a social network. We denote the set of neighbors of player i as
Ni = {j ∈ N \{ i}|gij =1 } as a subset of all agents Ni ⊆ N \{ i}.
As agents can observe their own payoﬀ and their neighbors Nd
i,a n yi n f o r m a t i o nt h a ti s
gathered on the risky alternatives is made public locally. Once one of the risky alternatives
is chosen and a payoﬀ is observed, the state of the world is perfectly revealed to the agent
and her neighbors. If, for example, alternative R1 yields a payoﬀ of r,t h ep o s t e r i o r
belief of being in state R1 jumps to 1, whereas the belief of being in R2 to 0. This
structure allows agents to explore the space of risky alternatives in the ﬁrst round and
to beneﬁt from this exploration in the second round. Additionally, this structure creates
as i t u a t i o no fs t r a t e g i ci n t e r a c t i o na sc h o i c e si nt h eﬁ r s tr o u n di n ﬂ u e n c et h eb e l i e f so fa l l
neighbors and their potential payoﬀs in the second round. In this strategic interaction,
the exploration of risky alternatives involves taking risks while others might strategically
delay the choice of the risky alternatives to the second round to beneﬁt from the risky
explorations of neighbors. Exploration in this context generates positive externalities by
generating payoﬀ-relevant informations about the state for other agents.
Strategies of agents
Each agents can choose in each period t between an action {kit}t≥0 such that kit ∈
{S,R1,R 2}.I nt h i sf r a m e w o r kkit = S denotes the choice of the safe alternative, kit = R1
and kit = R2 the choice of the risky alternatives at time t.A s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b o t h
states is identical, expected payoﬀs of choosing R1 and R2 are identical as long as states
of the world are not revealed. As a consequence, we assume that players are indiﬀerent
between R1 and R2 before the decision in the ﬁrst period. In this framework the choice
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i =2 k20 = R k20 = S
i =1
E(r)+r s + r
k10 = R E(r)+r E(r)+r
E(r)+r s + max(s,E(r))
k10 = S s + r s + max(s,E(r))
between R1 and R2 is trivial: risky alternatives are perfectly negatively correlated, the
expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst period is identical and states of the world are perfectly revealed
after the agent or at least one neighbor has tried one of the risky alternatives. Once the
agent or a neighbor has tried out one of the risky alternatives, agents strictly prefer the
revealed “good” one. To simplify the choice of kit ∈{ R1,R 2} as choosing alternative R.
The choices of all players will be denoted as kt = {kit,...,k nt} where kt ∈Kis the set of
all possible choices with K = K1 × ...×K n.
Solution concepts
For a ﬁrst analysis of the solution concept we assume that players maximize expected
proﬁts, have standard preferences and do not discount proﬁts from t =1 .I nt h i ss i m p l e
setting, the equilibrium solution of choices in t =0depends only on the ratio of s and
r.I fs<r/2,t h e nc h o o s i n gt h er i s k ya l t e r n a t i v ei st h ed o m i n a n ts t r a t e g yf o ra l la g e n t s
in the network as this maximizes the expected earnings over the course of the game as
E(r)+r>2s.I fs>3r/4,t h e nc h o o s i n gt h es a f ea l t e r n a t i v ei st h ed o m i n a n ts t r a t e g ya s
higher payoﬀs from knowing the state of the world do not outweigh the expected loss of
trying out a risky alternative as E(r)+r<2s.I n t h e s e t w o c a s e s d o m i n a n t s t r a t e g i e s
and a best-response unique Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
For r/2 ≤ s ≤ 3r/4 multiple Nash-equilibria exists as it would be suﬃcient for the creation of
information that exactly one agent in a neighborhood tries out a risky alternative. For this
range of parameters, neighborhood size and the structure of the network structure matter.
To illustrate our point we present the game for n =2and g12 =1in the normal form
(Figure 1). In this case, two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies exist with k0 = {R,S} and
k0 = {S,R},t h u so n l yo n eo ft h et w oa g e n t sh a st oe x p l o r et h es p a c eo fr i s k ya l t e r n a t i v e s
in the ﬁrst round and both players proﬁt from this exploration in the second round. Fur-
thermore a equilibrium in mixed strategies exists k0 = {(αR,(1 − α)S),(βR,(1 − β)S)}
with α and β depending on the ratio of s and r. E.g., for the case that r = 2s/3,t h em i x e d
equilibrium is α = β = 1/2 so that subjects toss a coin whether to choose R or S.
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a) Fully connected (n=2) b) Fully connected (n=4)
c) Ring (n=4) d) Star (n=4)
Neighborhood size
First, we look at changes of the network size |N| =nin fully connected networks, i.e. all
agents are able to observe each others with gij =1for every i,j ∈ N.I n t h i s c a s e t h e
neighborhood of every agent i in the network is equal to the set of agents Ni = N \{ i}.
This allows to isolate the eﬀect of group size. For r/2 ≤ s ≤ 3r/4,aN a s h - e q u i l i b r i u mi n
pure strategies exists, in which exactly one agent explores the risky alternatives in the ﬁrst
round. All other agents stay with the safe alternative and can achieve a higher payoﬀ r
in the second round. As players are symmetric, we should also expect that the individual
propensity of i to choose R in an equilibrium of mixed strategies decreases as n grows.
For example, if the fully connected network grows from n =2to n =4(see ﬁgure 2a
and 2b) and r = 2s/3,t h e nt h ei n d i v i d u a l sp r o p e n s i t yt oc h o o s eR decreases from 1 − 1/2
to 1 − (1/2)
1/3 ≈ 0.2063 in the mixed equilibrium. From these theoretical predictions we
derive our ﬁrst hypothesis about possible behavior in an experimental setup of the model:
Hypothesis 1: The average propensity to explore the risky alternatives decreases as the
fully connected network grows.
The same intuition hold in the case where networks are not fully connected, but all
agents are symmetric with respect to their neighborhood size |Ni| = c and have at least
two neighbors |Ni|≥2. Classical examples of these kind of network structures are the
lattice or the ring (see ﬁgure 2c). In this case, for every agent i with a neighborhood of
Ni ⊂ N \{ i},t h ep r o p e n s i t yt oe x p l o r et h er i s k ya l t e r n a t i v e si nt h em i x e de q u i l i b r i u m
decreases with the growing size of the neighborhood as in the case of the fully connected
network. This results leads to a precision of our ﬁrst hypothesis:
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neighborhood grows for networks with symmetric agents.
Network structure: the star
Introducing asymmetry with respect to the number of neighbors complicates the analysis
of expected equilibrium behavior. However, some examples of network structure are
nevertheless tractable without further reﬁnement. One example which has gained special
attention in the literature of network formation (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 2000) is the a star
network. This network, in its simplest form, consists of two types of agents: one center
agent i and n−1 symmetric periphery agents j ∈ N\{i}. The center agent i is connected
to all other agents j with gij =1while all agents in the periphery are only connected to
the center agent gji =1 .F i g u r e2 dd e p i c t ss u c has t a rn e t w o r kf o rn =4 .I naf r a m e w o r k
of costly link formation this network structure provides highest eﬃciency together with
shortest average pathlength2.
For r/2 ≤ s ≤ 3r/4, two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies exists, with either the center or
all periphery players choosing R. Additionally, a mixed equilibrium exists with diﬀerent
behavior for each type of agent. The center player has to play a best-response strategy
to players with only one neighbor (himself) and the periphery players have to play best-
response strategies to a neighbor with n − 1 neighbors (all periphery players). This
implies that the center has a higher propensity to explore the risky alternatives in the
mixed equilibrium for any n>2.F o re x a m p l e ,f o rn =4and r = 2s/3,t h ec e n t e ra g e n ti
has to play a best-response to a neighbor with just one opponent (himself), which implies
that his propensity to provide the public good is 1−1/2 in equilibrium; the same propensity
as agents in a bilateral relationship (network of n =2 ). The agents j,h o w e v e r ,k n o w
that the center player has n−1=3neighbors, which implies that they have to choose R
with a probability of 1 − (1/2)
1/3 ≈ 0.2063. This mixed-equilibrium leads to the following
hypothesis regarding possible behavior in the experimental setup:
Hypothesis 3: In a star network the central player has a higher propensity to explore the
risky alternatives than the periphery players when all agents play a best-response
strategy.
Note however, that this mixed equilibrium does not maximize the expected payoﬀ of the
network. A equilibrium that maximizes the payoﬀ of the network would be a situation in
which the center agent chooses R while all periphery agents choose S in the ﬁrst round of
2I.e. the number of links (edges) that are necessary to traverse to reach any agent (node) in the
network.
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round. If the center agent is concerned about the eﬃciency of the whole network, he
should choose R in every instance.3 In this case, the central agent in a star network
should adopt even more than agents in a bilateral relationship (network of n =2 ).
Hypothesis 4: If the central agent in a star network is concerned about the eﬃciency
of the network, he should explore the risky alternative more often than agents in a
bilateral relationship.
Additional to these theoretical predictions, participants in an experimental setting might
deviate from equilibrium predictions because of limited and costly cognitive ressources.
This leads to a simpliﬁed decision-making process in which not all information is properly
processed. In a recent paper on public good games in network structures, Rosenkranz
and Weitzel (2008) observe subjects failing to play equilibrium strategies in complex
network structures while still reacting on changes in the network structure. Following
their observation, agents may react on changes in their own neighborhood but do not
account for the neighborhood of neighbors and, hence, their position in the network. To
simplify decision-processing they play a best-response to neighbors that are erroneously
perceived as similar to themselves. In this case, they would apply a correct strategy, but
with a wrong perception of the model (DellaVigna, 2009). The results of Rosenkranz and
Weitzel are comparable to a situation described by Galeotti et al. (2009) where agents
are only partially informed of the network structure. This kind of ignorance about the
network strucure has a couple of consequences for sparsely connected networks. E.g., in
the star network, equilibrium predictions shift diametrically. In a group of four, the center
player faces three neighbors and might reason like an agent in a group of four. Contrarily,
the periphery players face just one neighbor and might reason like an agent in a group of
two. These observations from previous experiments in similar setting lead to a completely
contrary behavior:
Hypothesis 5: If agents assume that their neighbors’ reasoning is similar to themselves,
center agents would have a lower propensity to choose the risky alternatives than
agents in the periphery.
Behavioral hypotheses on learning
Playing according to the Nash equilibrium poses high demands on the cognitive capability
of agents. In order to play the Nash-strategy in the ﬁrst period of the game at least three
3This does not mean that an equilibrium with the center choosing R is payoﬀ-dominant.
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tions regarding the proﬁtability of alternatives and have to implement this information
in actions. (2) Agents must be forward-looking which implies that they recognize the
value of the information for themselves and others. (3) Agents have to be strategically
rational which implies that they have to recognize that they are in a situation of strategic
interaction.
Charness and Levin (2005) ﬁnd in an experiment on two-armed bandit models, that agents
underestimate the informational value of their own actions. If agents underestimate the
informational value of choosing R,t h eg e n e r a lp r o p e n s i t yt ot a k er i s k si nt h eﬁ r s tp e r i o d
might be lower than predicted by the mixed equilibrium. The same eﬀect can be ex-
pected if agents are on average risk averse. Originating from the psychological literature
and prominently discussed in the economic literature by Erev and Roth (1998) subjects
might not learn perfectly from the feedback in their environment. Following this litera-
ture, agents might not perfectly respond to revealed information and choose sub-optimal
alternatives. Agents might need more stimuli (e.g., more than one piece of information) to
update their beliefs about the state of the world and choose a risky alternative. Therefore,
a larger neighborhood might associated with better learning as more stimuli are possibly
made available. Following these behavioral implications, deviations from a proﬁt maximiz-
ing strategy might be observable which lead to deviations from equilibrium predictions.
However, once we control for the informational environment, these decision making errors
should not have an additional eﬀect on either group size or network structure.
3E x p e r i m e n t a l D e s i g n
The experiment was conducted in September 2009 in the computer laboratory of the
Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004)
and overall 160 undergraduate students from a wide variety of majors participated in 10
sessions. After registration, subjects were randomly seated at computers and received a
outline of the experiment and detailed instruction of the game. Subjects could consult
these instructions, which are provided in the appendix, during the whole course of the
experiment. The experiment and the questionnaire were fully computerized with the help
of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Based on the previous section, we test our hypotheses experimentally by manipulating
network size, network structure and subjects’ position in three treatments. In all treat-
ments, the game lasts for two rounds, alternative S yields a payoﬀ s of €2, while the
superior payoﬀ r is €3. Two baseline treatments investigate the eﬀect of group size on
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n =4(BL4; see ﬁgure 2b). One treatment investigates the eﬀect of network structure in a
group of four players with one center agent and three periphery agents (STAR; see ﬁgure
2d). With this parameterization, we should observe the equilibrium outcomes discussed
in the examples of section 2. That is, the individual’s propensity to choose R should de-
crease from BL2 to BL4 as described in hyopthesis 1. In the STAR treatment, the center
agent should behave as players in BL2 whereas the periphery agents should behave as
players in BL4 following hypothesis 3. If agents erroneously ignore the network structure
(hypothesis 5), central players would behave as players in BL4 whereas the periphery
agents should behave as players in BL2.
At the beginning of the experiment matching groups of eight participants were randomly
formed. Overall, the game was repeated 15 times with a within-subject design. Every
subject participated in all three treatments and subjects were randomly rematched within
matching groups at the beginning of each game while the order of treatments was ran-
domized over matching groups. In each treatment, the game was repeated 5 times and
the position in networks was randomly assigned for every game. At the beginning of each
game, subjects were informed about the size of the groups, the network structure and
their position within the network. Subjects were also informed that a state was randomly
chosen. To account for learning and order eﬀects, matching groups were allocated to one
of two sequences. In the ﬁrst sequence BL4 was played 5 times, then BL2 5 times and
then STAR for 5 times. In the second sequence this order of treatments was reversed.
For payment, one of the 15 games is selected for payment at the end of the experiment
with a draw from a physical urn. Additionally, subjects earned a show-up fee of €3s o
that average earning was € 7.10. The experiment lasted on average 45 minutes including
instructions, questionnaires, registration, and payment.
This design allows to account for learning eﬀects and ﬁxed subject-speciﬁc unobservable
factors such as risk aversion and to estimate the eﬀect of changes in the network size,
structure and network position on the propensity to explore the risky alternatives in the
ﬁrst period. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked a questionnaire for
demographic covariates. In addition questions of trusting behavior and willingness to risk
taking from the GSOEP (Wagner et al., 2007) were asked and subjects had to describe
their strategy in detail.
11
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0114R e s u l t s
4.1 Risk taking
In this section, we look at the choice of R in the ﬁrst period of the game. Figure 3 shows
the proportion of all subjects choosing one of the risky alternatives in period t =0by
treatment (Figure 3a) and repetition (Figure 3b). The results indicate that the proportion
of subjects that take risks in the group of two (BL2) is on average 0.33, pooled across all
repetitions of the game in this treatment. The propensity to take risk in a group of four
(BL4) is consistently lower for all repetitions of the game with a pooled average of 0.26.
The propensity to take risks is lower in the center of the STAR then in the periphery,
with exception of period 1 and 15. We test our conjectures statistically by running a
linear regressions with a dummy variable for the choice of R in the ﬁrst period as the
dependent variable (See table 1). In column (a) we report a random eﬀects model with
dummy variables for treatment BL4 and dummy variables for both roles in the STAR
treatment with random eﬀects for subjects and matching groups.4 BL2 is the baseline
category in this model. The dummy variable for BL4 is negative and highly signiﬁcant
supporting hypothesis 1.
Result 1: The propensity in a fully connected group of four is signiﬁcantly lower than
in a group of two. Increasing group size in fully connected networks has a negative
eﬀect on the propensity to take risks.
The coeﬃcient for the periphery players in the STAR treatment is negative but insigniﬁ-
cant (p = 0.183) while the center players have a signiﬁcantly lower propensity to take risks
(p < 0.001). A χ2-test rejects equality of both STAR-coeﬃcients at the 5%-signiﬁcance
level (p = 0.011). This result is in sharp contrast to hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4. The
signiﬁcantly lower propensity to take risk supports hypothesis 5. Indeed, periphery play-
ers with only one neighbor do not play signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than players in a group of
two (BL2). In analogy, subjects in a group of four (BL4) do not play signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from players in the center of the STAR. A χ2-test does not reject (p = 0.449) the equality
of coeﬃcients for BL4 and STAR center. This indicates, that diﬀerent network structures
do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, besides varying the size of the neighborhood for agents.
As the neighborhood grows, subjects decrease their risk taking propensity. This is not in
line with the prediction of a theory where subjects play a best-response strategy to the
neighborhood of their neighbors. Instead, subjects behave similar to a symmetric, fully
4As a robustness check, the model was tested against results from a ﬁxed eﬀects regression. The Haus-
man test indicated that a random eﬀects model is uncritical in all speciﬁcations. To test the functional
form, a nonlinear Probit regression yield qualitatively similar results.
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(a) All repetitions pooled
































































































Notes: Y-axis shows the choices of R as the proportion of all
choices in the 1st period of the game by treatment. “BL2”
stands for fully connected network of two. “BL4” stands for
fully connected network of four. “STAR Center” stands for
players in the center of the star network of four. “STAR Pe-
riphery” stands for players in the periphery of the star network
of four. The dotted lines indicate the equilibrium predictions
at 0.5 in a group of two and 0.21 in group of four in fully
connected networks.
Notes: X-axis shows the number of repetition of the game
and Y-axis shows the choices of R as the proportion of all
choices in the 1st period of the game by treatment. White
dots indicate observations in fully connected network of two.
Black dots indicate observations in fully connected network of
four. White triangles indicate observations for players in the
center of the star network of four. Black triangles indicate
observations for players in the periphery of the star network
of four. The dotted lines indicate the equilibrium predictions
at 0.5 in a group of two and 0.21 in group of four in fully
connected networks.
13












































Observations 2400 2400 2400 2080
Notes: All regressions with a linear mixed eﬀects model with random eﬀects for subjects (160) and matching
groups (20). Columns indicate regression models with choice of R in the 1st period as dependent variable.
Rows indicate independent variables. “BL4” is a dummy variable for fully connected networks of four.
“STAR Periphery” is a dummy variable for players in the periphery of the star network. “STAR Center” is
a dummy variable for players in the center of the star. “Repetition” stands for the number of the repetition
of the game. Cells indicate coeﬃcients; standard errors in parenthesis. Stars indicate levels of signiﬁcance:
*p<0 . 5 ,* *p<0 . 0 1 ,* * *p<0 . 0 0 1 .
connected network in which their neighbors face the same strategic situation as they do.
However, agents do not completly ignore their information on the network structure but
react to a change in the size of their own neighborhood. This partial ignorance about the
network structure is in line with the “neighborhood heuristic” where agents misperceive
the strategic situation of neighbors to be similar to their own.
Result 2: The propensity to take risks is signiﬁcantly lower in the center of the STAR
then in the periphery. Increasing number of neighbors has a negative eﬀect on the
propensity to take risks.
Learning or order eﬀects might possibly confound the results. Therefore, we test for order
eﬀects by comparing the propensity to take risk in BL2 in both sequences. The results
of a χ2-test indicate that order eﬀects are negligeble with an average diﬀerence of 0.005
between the two sequences which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p = 0.881). To
control for learning eﬀects we include diﬀerent speciﬁcations for learning trends in the
regression (column (2) and (3) in table 1). Both, a linear learning trend (p = 0.014)
and a logarithmic learning trend (p = 0.023) points towards signiﬁcant learning eﬀects in
the ﬁrst repetitions of the game (See also ﬁgure 3b). However, all treatment eﬀects are
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Notes: Y-axis shows the choices of R as the proportion of all
choices in the 2nd period. Left bar indicates that the same
subject chose R in 1st period. Middle bar indicates that the
subject and all of her neighbors chose S in the 1st period.
Right bar indicates that the subject chose S in the 1st period
but at least one neighbor chose R. Width of bars represents
relative frequency of situations. “Good alternative” stands for
R-alternative, which yields a payoﬀ of three. “Bad alternative”
stands for R-alternative, which yields a payoﬀ of zero.
qualitatively robust with respect to this learning eﬀect. Indeed, if the ﬁrst two repetitions
are dropped (column (4) in table 1), the logarithmic learning trend becomes non-existent
(p = 0.586). Again, all treatment eﬀects remain signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
4.2 Learning
In this section we analyze whether subjects managed to update their beliefs about the
state of the world correctly. Subjects’ ability to update beliefs might inﬂuence their
decision in the ﬁrst round as the perception of the proﬁtability of risky alternatives is
aﬀected. Estimates on the eﬀect of group size or network structure on risk taking might
be biased if decision making errors in the second period of the game are correlated with
either group size or network structure. Overall, 23 subjects (14.3%) stayed with the safe
alternative in all rounds and all repetitions of the game.5 We will discard these subjects
for further analysis in this subsection. Note that all results from the previous section hold
qualitatively with the cleaned set of experimental subjects where subjects choose R at
least once.
5This is a strategy that yields a reasonable payoﬀ while spending minimal cognitive eﬀort.
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Dependent
variable
Choice of good R Choice of bad R



































































Observations 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055
Notes: All regressions with a probit model and cluster robust standard errors (20 matching groups). Columns indicate
regression models with choice of the good or bad R-alternative in the second period as dependent variable. Rows indicate
independent variables. “States revealed” is a dummy variable indicating that R was at least tried once in 1st period. “>1
choice” is a dummy variable indicating that R was at least tried twice in the 1st period. “Own choice” is a dummy variable
indicating that R was tried out by the subject in the 1st period. “Neg feedback” is a dummy variable that R yielded only a
payoﬀ of zero in the 1st period. “Pos & Neg feedback” is a dummy variable that R yielded a payoﬀ of zero and three in the
ﬁrst period. The other variables are described in table 2. Cells indicate marginal eﬀects; standard errors in parenthesis.
Stars indicate levels of signiﬁcance: † p<0 . 1 ,*p<0 . 5 ,* *p<0 . 0 1 ,* * *p<0 . 0 0 5
Figure 4 depicts the choices of subjects in the second round, depending on their own
choices in the ﬁrst round and the information that is available about the state of world.
In the second round, subject could again choose between the safe alternative, the good
R-alternative yielding a payoﬀ of three and the bad R-alternative yielding a payoﬀof
zero. If subjects chose R in the ﬁrst round, they opted for the good alternative in 76,7%
of second rounds. In 6.4% of all choices they picked the bad risky alternative which yields
a payoﬀ of zero. The bad alternative is chosen somewhat more often (9.0% of choices)
if the feedback from the ﬁrst round is a payoﬀ of zero. In the situation where the states
were revealed only by neighbors, the choice of the good alternative drops to 63.7% of all
choices. However, the choice of the bad risky alternative drops as well to 4% of all choices.
In those cases where neighbors took R1 and R2 in the ﬁrst round, not a single subject
chose to try the bad alternative in the second round. If the states were not revealed by
own choice or a neighbors choice, about 11.5% decide to take a risky alternative.
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by running regressions on a dummy variable for the choice of the good alternative or
the choice of the bad alternative as dependent variables. Results of the regressions are
reported in table 2. A probit model with adjusted standard errors for correlations within
matching groups was used in all speciﬁcations.6 Column (1) analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent
pieces of information about the state of the world on subjects’ adoption of the good risky
alternative, column (2) and (3) adds treatment and role dummies. A dummy variable
for revealed states indicates that the subject or one of her neighbors tried out a risky
alternative in the ﬁrst period. The size of the coeﬃcient, around 0.6, reveals that adoption
of the good alternative is not perfect.
Other dummy variables indicate whether at least two subjects in the neighborhood (in-
cluding the subject herself) chose a risky alternative (“>1 choice”), whether the same
subject chose R in the ﬁrst period (“own choice”), whether only a payoﬀ of zwero was
available as information about the states of the world (“neg feedback”) or whether both
R1 and R2 were chosen in the ﬁrst period (“pos & neg feedback”).
First, we look at the case where at least two subjects in the neighborhood chose a risky
alternative (“>1 choice”). In line with reinforcement learning, this additional feedback
increases learning (p = 0.007). The dummy variable “own choice” turns out to be insignif-
icant (p = 0.132). The increased propensity to choose a good alternative after the choice
of R shown in ﬁgure 4 might therefore originate from changes in the other covariates (e.g.,
“>1 choice”) or subject speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. E.g, if. the subject is a risk taker and takes
R more often in the ﬁrst period, then this is correlated with choices in the second round.
The dummy “neg feedback” should not have an eﬀect on the adoption of the good alterna-
tive if learning is perfect. This negative feedback has the same informational value about
the states of the world. However, subjects ﬁnd it signiﬁcantly harder to learn from this
negative feedback. This observation is in line with reinforcement learning which predicts
that positive rewards make learning easier. In the case that both R1 and R2 were chosen,
the dummy variable “pos & neg feedback” takes a value of one. This additional feedback
does not enhance performance but makes learning less eﬀective.
Column (2) of table 2 uses the dummy variables for treatments and roles as regressors on
the choice of the good alternative in the second period. Column (3) adds these covariates
to the previously discussed model of column (1). Playing in the periphery of the star
is signiﬁcantly associated with fewer choices of the good alternative in the second round
without controlling for the information that is available about the state of the world. This
coeﬃcient is reduced and turns insigniﬁcant (p = 0.261) once the available information is
added in column (3). This is an indication that periphery players suﬀer in their ability
6Al i n e a rﬁ x e de ﬀ e c t sm o d e ly i e l d sq u a l i t a t i v e l ys i m i l a rr e s u l t s .
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choose a risky alternative by the central star players in the ﬁrst period. Additionally,
column (3) shows that decision making errors in the second round are not associated with
either group size or network structure. Once the informational environment resulting
from choices in the ﬁrst period is added as a control, coeﬃcients are no longer signiﬁcant.
Result 3: Subjects on average react on the information that is provided to them and learn
about the state of the world. However, learning is not perfect and decision making
errors persist. Decision making errors are not signiﬁcantly associated with diﬀerent
group sizes or network structures once the information on the state of the world is
included as a covariate.
Columns (4) to (6) use the choice of the bad alternative as the dependent variable. This
severe decision making error is neither associated with network size or structure nor with
the information on the states of the world. Only negative feedback from choices in the ﬁrst
round intensiﬁes this decision making error signiﬁcantly. In analogy to the ﬁnding from
adopting the good alternative subjects ﬁnd it harder to learn from negative feedback.
Additionally, subjects ﬁnd make slightly less errors if states are revealed or additional
feedback is available. Similar to the ﬁndings of Charness and Levin (2005), subjects
stay with the wrong alternative in the second round after choosing it in the ﬁrst period.
Although this eﬀect is a the verge of conventional signiﬁcance levels (p = 0.089).
Result 4: Subjects ﬁnd it signiﬁcantly harder to learn from negative feedback. They make
more mistakes when confronted with negative feedback.
Overall, the majority of subjects reacted on the information that was made available by the
trials of themselves and others. Admittedly, learning in this game is far from perfect and
subjects make errors. Players react consistent with the theory of reinforcement learning
and ignore information that is available to them. Decision making errors, however, are
not associated with diﬀerent network structures and group sizes.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has analyzed theoretically and experimentally how strategic experimentation
by risk taking interacts with the size of the neighborhood and the network structure. In
the presence of information externalities a strategic interaction arises with an incentive to
free-ride. Our results show that subjects indeed act strategically and react to the size of
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players, behavior is diametrically opposed to equilibrium predictions. Instead of playing
ab e s t - r e s p o n s et ot h en e i g h b o r h o o do fn e i g h b o r s ,s u b j e c t sb e h a v ea si ft h e yi g n o r et h e i r
position within the network. Although the network structure is common knowledge,
agents treat their neighborhood in the same way as in fully connected networks. This
observation can be explained by assuming that subjects erroneously treat neighbors as
similar to themselves and fail to put themselves in the shoes of others. Our results suggest
that assuming that agents are only partially informed about the network structure as in
Galeotti et al. (2009) might be a good description of individual behavior. This boundedly
rational play results in under-eﬃcient risk taking and less adoption in the periphery of
network because central players fail to recognize the implications of their position in the
network.
This experiment has shown that individual’s risk taking depends crucially on the struc-
ture of their neighborhood. Also second round adoption of technologies depends on the
structure of the neighborhood. This ﬁnding yields implications for the ﬁeld as strate-
gic consideration seem to be very relevant for risk taking. Central players, which are
so crucial for the adoption of new technologies, may face incentives that are detrimental
for whole communities. However, in ﬁeld settings this incentive eﬀect of an individuals’
degree might be conﬁned by the fact that more risk taking and cooperative individuals
ﬁnd it easier to become central players, or “opinion leaders” (Rogers, 2003). Nevertheless,
these experimental ﬁndings call for actions to make risk taking more attractive to central
players or reduce the risk associated with new technologies.
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B.1 Printed instructions (English translation)
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation!
In this experiment – ﬁnanced by the German Research Foundation (DFG) – you can earn
money, depending on your own performance and decisions. Therefore, it is important that
you read these instructions carefully. If you have any questions during the experiment,
please raise your hand. We will then come to you and answer your question. Please
pose your question quietly. All participants of this experiment receive the same printed
instructions. The information on the screen, however, is only intended for the respective
participant. Please do not look at the screens of other participants and do not talk to
each other. If you oﬀend against these rules, we are unfortunately required to expel you
from the experiment. Please switch oﬀ your mobiles now.
General schedule:
• This experiment consists of 15 repetitions of the game and a questionnaire
The game:
• The game consists of 2r o u n d s .
• At the beginning of each game you will form a group of 2o r4r a n d o m l yc h o s e n
participants. You will be informed before each game on your screen how
many participants form a group.
• After every round you will be informed about the decisions and proﬁts of some
group members. You will be informed before each game on your screen who is
informed about whom.
• There a 2p o s s i b l es t a t e sfor the game.
• One of the states is chosen randomly at the beginning of each game.B o t h
states are equally likely to be chosen.
• The chosen state is valid for the whole game (both rounds) and the whole group.
No group member will be informed about the chosen state.
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of 3a l t e r n a t i v e s : S ,Xa n dY . The proﬁt of the alternatives depends on the
chosen state for the game.
• In each round alternatives yield the following proﬁts:
Alternative S Alternative X Alternative Y
State 1 2€ 3€ 0€
State 2 2€ 0€ 3€
• Alternative S always yields a proﬁt of 2€
Alternative X yields a proﬁt of 3€ in state 1 and 0€ in state 2
Alternative Y yields a proﬁt of 0€ in state 1 and 3€ in state 2
• You will be informed about the proﬁt after each round.
- Info about your proﬁt
- Info about choice and proﬁt - Info about your proﬁt
- Groups are formed - Info about group size of others - Info about choice and proﬁt
- States of the game chosen - Info about who is informed - Decision - Decision of others
New game Round 1 Round 2
Payment:
• After the last game, one of the 15 repetitions is randomly selected for payments.
• One volunteer will choose a ball with the number from an urn. The chosen number
determines the game for payment.
• Your payment will be payed after the questionnaire in a way that no other partici-
pant will be informed how much you earned.
• You will earn additional 3€ for your participation.
Further Schedule: After you have read the instructions carefully, please wait for the other
participants and then start with the computer program on your screen.
Good luck!
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